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INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
1
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, one of the most closely watched
cases of the 2010 Term. In Concepcion, the Court considered whether
states may condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements on
2
the availability of class-wide arbitration proceedings. While the subject of class arbitration is rarely viewed as a headline-grabbing legal
topic, Concepcion attracted the attention of many consumer advocates,
corporate counsel, and procedural scholars because of its far-reaching
implications for consumer and employment contracts and class action
3
policy. Ultimately, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) preempts states from invalidating class action waivers in arbitration agreements because these invalidations stand as an obstacle to
4
the purposes behind the FAA.
Was this result surprising? Not in the least. Indeed, given the increasingly predictable road the Court had taken in previous FAA cas5
es, a contrary ruling exhibiting deference to a state’s views on arbitration would have represented an abrupt tug on the FAA steering wheel.
But leaving the Court’s track record aside, was the Court’s decision to
limit the role of states in shaping class action policy a legally sound
and principled conclusion? In this Comment, I argue that it was not.
Because class actions are so intimately linked to the vindication of
substantive rights, the Court should not have unilaterally made a policy decision as to when the use of class proceedings is appropriate.
Though class action policy discussions typically focus on the effi6
cacy of class action litigation or the inner workings of Rule 23 of the
7
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Concepcion did not directly involve
1

131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
Id. at 1744.
3
See generally AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.
com/case-files/cases/att-mobility-v-concepcion (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (listing amicus
briefs from consumer advocacy associations, trade associations, and dispute resolution
professors).
4
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
5
See infra Section I.B.
6
See infra note 189.
7
Rule 23 provides procedural rules for class action suits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For
the Court’s most recent discussion of Rule 23, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541, 2548-61 (2011).
2
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either of these topics. Instead, Concepcion centered on the class ac8
tion’s close cousin, class arbitration —proceedings involving similarly
situated litigants that occur before an arbitrator, rather than before a
judge or jury in court. While the development of class arbitration was
still in its embryonic stages, several judges and businesses adopted the
view that this method of dispute resolution was antithetical to the
9
whole point of arbitrating in the first place, which is to provide a
10
speedy and efficient alternative to litigation. Eventually, with the addition of more claimants and in light of the uncertainty surrounding
this new form of aggregate procedure, class arbitration became what
was described as “a lose-lose proposition” to which “no rational busi11
ness [would] agree.”
As a solution, defendant businesses turned to their contracts for
protection. By inserting class action waivers into their arbitration
agreements—agreements that were themselves part of larger contracts
with consumers, employees, and other actors in the marketplace—
businesses attempted to narrowly circumscribe the procedures avail12
able to their adversaries. In essence, once an opposing party agreed
to arbitrate any future claims and also to waive his right to bring proceedings as a class, the only remaining option was bilateral arbitration:
arbitration between two individual parties.
It was only matter of time before this solution was attacked in
court. In particular, consumers pleaded that class action waivers were
exculpatory provisions in the small claims setting because the inclusion of these waivers in arbitration agreements effectively relieved

8

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson,
J., concurring and dissenting) (“[C]lass procedures would tend to make arbitration
inefficient instead of efficient, lengthy instead of expeditious, and procedural instead
of informal.”), rev’d sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
10
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (describing one
of the FAA’s goals as the “encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution”).
11
Brief for Petitioner at 22, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL
3017755, at *22.
12
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 437 (2010) (“[The] received
wisdom [is] that some businesses’ use of consumer arbitration clauses is motivated, at
least in part, by a desire to reduce their exposure to class actions.”); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104
MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005) (“In the late 1990s, trade-journal articles first appeared
encouraging corporate counsel to consider redrafting contracts to include provisions
requiring consumers and others to waive the right to participate in class actions or
even group arbitrations.”).
9
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13

businesses from liability. Without class proceedings, no individual
14
consumer in the small claims setting had an incentive to file a claim.
In some states, such arguments were initially met with favorable responses. For example, an early opinion on the matter in California
held that such class action waivers supplied defendants with a “‘get out
15
of jail free’ card.” These waivers were also considered troublesome
because they were almost always found in contracts of adhesion, or on
16
a “take it or leave it” basis.
But the businesses in these suits were not without a strong defense.
Virtually all of the arbitration agreements in dispute were governed by
17
the FAA, a federal statute that the Supreme Court has consistently
held to proclaim a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree18
ments.” Thus, the common argument defendants raised in motions to
compel arbitration was that the FAA required courts to enforce the ar19
bitration agreements, and with them, the class action waivers. Under
this theory, the FAA, by way of the Supremacy Clause, would preempt
state rules relating to arbitration. On this point, however, state and circuit courts divided. For example, some states and circuits ruled that the
class action waiver was enforceable on its face or that the FAA
20
But other decisions—
preempted state policies to the contrary.
including the California Supreme Court’s leading opinion in Discover
13

See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (examining whether a class action waiver in a cell phone contract’s arbitration agreement “effectively exculpat[ed] its drafter from liability for a large class of wrongful conduct”);
Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99-100 (N.J. 2006)
(engaging in a similar inquiry in the context of a consumer loan contract).
14
See Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007 (noting that Washington customers had brought no
individual claims against the cell phone provider over a six-year period).
15
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002).
16
Id. at 867.
17
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). The Act provides that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of . . . a contract, transaction, or
refusal [involving commerce], shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. § 2.
18
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (quoting same).
19
See, e.g., Scott, 161 P.3d at 1008 (introducing the defendant’s argument that its
cell phone contract was covered by the FAA).
20
See, e.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (enforcing a waiver based on its explicit language); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D.,
693 N.W.2d 918, 927 (N.D. 2005) (same); see also Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing a district court’s conclusion
that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and compelling arbitration pursuant to the FAA).
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Bank v. Superior Court—held that § 2 of the FAA, known as the savings
clause, enabled states to strike down class action waivers in the small
21
Further complicating
claims setting on unconscionability grounds.
the analysis in some cases were additional clauses that ostensibly altered
the cost equation for litigants, such as clauses providing for the reim22
bursement of arbitration costs or the payment of attorneys’ fees.
Concepcion took the Discover Bank rule head on, with the majority
23
ultimately siding in favor of preemption. In doing so, the Court limited states’ latitude to strike down class action waivers and effectively
forced upon the states its own views regarding the pros and cons of
certain aggregation policies (i.e., policies relating to the aggregation
of claimants in a class action or collective action). It is here, I will argue, that the Court erred. Aggregation policies should not be a topic
solely for our nation’s highest court. As several commentators have
recently argued, the availability of class proceedings is often deeply
rooted in substantive regulatory policies, including state policies on
24
In light of this inseparable
the resolution of consumer disputes.
connection to substantive law, it should be the state’s prerogative to
determine whether the availability of class proceedings in arbitration
would help further its substantive policies. In support of this argument, I will highlight the inconsistencies within the Concepcion opinion,
as well as the doctrinal confusion between the Court’s treatment of
one aggregation mechanism, class arbitration, in Concepcion and the
treatment of another aggregation mechanism, the class action, in a

21

See, e.g., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (finding that “under some circumstances . . . class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are unenforceable”
and that the FAA did not preempt California law on this issue), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 988-93 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an arbitration
agreement was unconscionable under state law and thus not preempted by the FAA);
Scott, 161 P.3d at 1009 (same).
22
See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (describing the cost-shifting provisions in
AT&T’s arbitration agreement).
23
Id. at 1753.
24
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21 (2010) (arguing that Rule 23 does
not set aggregation policy, but rather is “merely the mechanism for carrying an aggregate proceeding into effect when the underlying law supports that result”); cf. David
Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class
Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 716 (2011) (suggesting that the authors of Rule 23(b)(2)
considered class treatment as “essential to the vindication of substantive rights”).
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recent Rules Enabling Act challenge, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
25
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
In Part I of this Comment, I will analyze both the history of the
FAA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this statute in relation
to class arbitration. Part II will briefly discuss lower courts’ use of unconscionability as a bulwark against class action waivers, while Part III
will analyze the Concepcion case itself. Part IV will juxtapose the FAA
decisions with Shady Grove. In Part V, I will examine several questions
that remain unanswered after Concepcion and discuss avenues for
reform. These avenues include a potential amendment to the FAA,
administrative regulations that could target class action waivers, and
most importantly, a change in the way the Court approaches class actions in future cases, which should involve a greater appreciation for
the role class actions play in the enforcement of substantive law.
I. A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The question of whether states may mandate that class proceedings be available in arbitration, notwithstanding an express contractual agreement to the contrary, ultimately turns on courts’ interpretation of the FAA. Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the FAA broadly and has in turn exhibited a considerable amount of
deference to the black-and-white terms of the arbitration agreements
26
at issue. But much of the FAA jurisprudence is constructed upon a
foundation of assumptions about the intent of the FAA’s framers—
assumptions that are still being questioned today. This Part will briefly
analyze the history and text of the FAA and describe the FAA case law
leading up to Concepcion.
A. The Text and History of the FAA
The key language of the FAA appears in § 2, which states in pertinent part that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for

25

130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion). The Court in Shady Grove held that
Rule 23 superseded a New York state law that prohibited certain class actions. Id. at
1437-38.
26
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008) (noting that the
Court “has interpreted the FAA expansively, nullifying most of the state laws and public policies that formerly excluded many types of transactions, such as consumer and
employment transactions, from arbitration”).
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27

the revocation of any contract.” This latter clause, which provides
courts with room to invalidate arbitration agreements on generally
applicable contract defenses, is commonly referred to as the FAA’s
28
“savings clause.”
An idea that has persisted throughout the FAA line of cases is that
Congress enacted this language in 1925 in response to hostility from
29
the state courts toward the use of arbitration. The thought goes that
the Act endeavored to put arbitration agreements on an “equal foot30
ing with other contracts.” In Concepcion, both the majority opinion
and Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion subscribe to this view, albeit to
varying degrees. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion takes a more expansive view, suggesting that the FAA’s goal of achieving streamlined proceedings is of roughly equal importance to the FAA’s corresponding
31
goal of enforcing private agreements to arbitrate. Justice Breyer, on
the other hand, cautions against viewing the efficiency objective as a
32
primary goal of the statute. Moreover, Justice Breyer submits that
when Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, the statute’s scope was intended to cover agreements between merchants possessing “roughly
33
equivalent bargaining power.” Scalia explicitly rejects this point,
proposing that “[s]uch a limitation appears nowhere in the text” and
that recent cases involving unequal bargaining partners have declined
34
to apply the statute in this manner.
While Justice Breyer leaves much to be desired in his explanation
35
of the FAA’s legislative history, his account more closely aligns with
scholarly research on the issue. For example, in a detailed historical
27
28

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 n.8 (9th Cir.

2007).
29

See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995) (explaining that “American courts initially followed [the] English practice . . . [of] prohibiting arbitration clause enforcement” and that Congress “was ‘motivated, first and
foremost, by a . . . desire’ to change this antiarbitration rule” (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985))).
30
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
31
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2010) (describing
the dissent’s view that the expeditious resolution of claims is not the overriding goal of
the FAA as “greatly misleading”).
32
Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33
Id. at 1759.
34
Id. at 1749 n.5 (majority opinion) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)).
35
Justice Breyer cites several congressional reports but gives little explanation as
to how such reports reflect his account of congressional intent regarding the scope of
the FAA. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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account of the statute, Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen write that
36
the FAA was “not necessarily the product of hostility to arbitration.”
Rather, the movement behind the passage of the FAA centered mostly
on promoting interstate commerce and “mak[ing] the benefits of ar37
bitration generally available to the business world.” To be sure, it is
likely that at least some state judges were miffed by the idea of having
their cases pulled from their dockets because of a binding arbitration
clause, and that by passing the FAA, Congress could ensure that these
38
judges would refrain from acting territorially. But hostility, according to Carrington and Haagen, was not the main concern. In fact, although state courts and legislatures were worried that binding arbitration clauses could become a “trap for the unwary” and could be used
39
“as a potential means of economic oppression,” many courts favored
40
arbitration as a general matter.
Moreover, Carrington and Haagen suggest that Congress intended the FAA to apply to sophisticated businesses and not to stifle
41
Progressive-era concerns for the weak and vulnerable. Indeed, the
FAA excluded employment contracts of certain transportation work42
ers from its scope. While the FAA’s true purpose may prove to be
evasive, legislators are currently attempting to resolve the debate. As
Part V will discuss in more detail, congressional lawmakers, acting in
response to the Court’s ruling in Concepcion, have introduced a bill—
43
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 —that would amend the FAA.
Among the bill’s findings is a provision stating that the FAA “was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally
44
similar sophistication and bargaining power.” Certainly, Concepcion’s
supporters will likely view this statement as a blatant example of revisionist history. But at a minimum, this statement, along with research
36

Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 339.
37
Id. at 341 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that some courts
“refus[ed] to order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate”).
39
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 340, 343.
40
See id. at 339 (explaining that “arbitration was widely favored in America”); see
also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 19 (1992) (“[C]ontrary to modern
folklore . . . the premodern statutory law of arbitration was largely supportive of that
institution, as was the common law.”).
41
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 344.
42
Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1431.
43
S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).
44
Id. § 2(1).
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such as Carrington and Haagen’s, demonstrates the considerable disagreement over the majority opinion’s historical account of the FAA.
Finally, one important feature of the historical period during
which Congress enacted the FAA is that federal courts were still operating under the Swift v. Tyson regime, which applied general federal
common law to the types of commercial contracts that included arbi45
tration provisions. It would be another thirteen years before the
Court would require that state law be applied in federal-diversity con46
tract disputes. With this in mind, any attempt to recreate Congress’s
intent with respect to the savings clause in diversity suits takes a bit of
47
creativity. As I discuss below, much of the debate surrounding the
savings clause focuses on how much latitude it affords the states in invalidating arbitration agreements. But given that Congress may have
48
not had state contract law in mind at the time of enactment, a determination of Congress’s intent regarding the statute’s deference to
that law may be a Sisyphean task.
B. Case Law Interpreting the FAA
In the decades since the FAA’s enactment, the Supreme Court has
49
heard numerous challenges to its applicability. And in response to
these challenges, the Court has ruled in favor of the party requesting

45

41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842). The Swift court held that the interpretation and effect of
“contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature . . . are to be sought, not in
the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of
commercial jurisprudence.” Id. at 19. For a discussion of the expansion and eventual
displacement of the Swift doctrine, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 550-64 (6th ed. 2009).
46
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State.”).
47
Cf. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1238
(2011) (“[T]he language of the FAA is simply too indeterminate, and the congressional record leading to its enactment too sparse, to draw any firm conclusions about its
original meaning.”).
48
See Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionability,
and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 811 (2004) (“[T]he FAA was enacted in the shadow of
Swift v. Tyson, meaning that the enacting Congress would not have expected federal
courts to apply any state common law.”).
49
Much of the FAA jurisprudence has focused on the arbitrability of particular
statutory claims, see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985), and the appropriate procedural interplay between the courts and the
arbitrator, see, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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50

arbitration virtually every time, displaying in some cases a Lochner51
esque approach to the freedom of contract. While an extended discussion of the FAA jurisprudence exceeds the scope of this Comment,
this Section will discuss several early decisions that helped shape the
Court’s reasoning in Concepcion, as well as the Court’s previous encounters with class arbitration in the FAA context.
The modern Court’s policy toward the enforcement of arbitration
clauses has its roots in two key decisions from the Burger Court. In
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., Justice
Brennan set the standard for future FAA cases: “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural poli52
cies to the contrary.” A year later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, a majority of the Court held that in creating a federal substantive law of arbitrability, Congress intended for the FAA to apply not only in federal
53
courts, but also in state courts. Furthermore, the Court explained
that the policy from Moses H. Cone aimed to “foreclose state legislative
54
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”
Thus, when the Court applied this policy to a California statute that
required judicial consideration of claims arising from a franchise
agreement, it held that the FAA preempted the statute, notwithstand55
ing the fact that the appeal came from the California Supreme Court.
Yet the majority’s view that the FAA applies to state courts was met
with considerable resistance, and ironically, the debate over Southland
50

See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1092 (2011) (“[T]he modern Court has never yet met
an arbitration clause that it didn’t like.”).
51
In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court held that a New York state law limiting employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day was “arbitrary
interference” with the freedom to contract. 198 U.S. 45, 46, 63 (1905). Justice
Holmes, in his well-known dissent, criticized the Court’s promotion of economic due
process, stating that “the 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” (i.e., a nineteenth-century English work advocating laissez-faire philosophies). Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But as Carrington and Haagen suggest, a
variation of economic due process is reemerging via the FAA. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 338 (“Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, so long lost from constitutional law, has been found by the Court to be alive and well and residing in the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925.” (footnote omitted)).
52
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
53
465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984). Previously, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., this issue had been raised but left “up in the air.” 388 U.S. 395, 424
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
54
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
55
Id. at 5, 16-17.
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may still be affecting the Court’s modern-day certiorari decisions, such
as its decision to hear Concepcion. In Southland, Justice O’Connor
penned a vigorous dissent, arguing that the legislative history of the
FAA demonstrated Congress’s unambiguous intention for the statute
56
to apply only in federal court. The academic literature on the history
57
of the FAA tends to support her view. Her argument, moreover, has
received subsequent support from conservative justices. Justice Scalia
has written that he “stand[s] ready to join four other Justices in overrul58
ing [Southland],” and Justice Thomas has subscribed to this view as re59
cently as 2008. If Concepcion had been an appeal from a state court,
then it is uncertain whether the FAA would have applied at all, because
the Court, particularly Justices Scalia and Thomas, might have felt ob60
liged to reconsider the majority’s view in Southland. But it is perhaps
no coincidence that the Court consistently rejected certiorari petitions
involving unconscionability rulings in state courts, and instead waited
to grant certiorari to Concepcion, a Ninth Circuit case interpreting Cali61
fornia law. As one commentator has put it, the Court’s current certiorari process enables it to “wait for the right vehicles in which to make
law,” and a federal case, like Concepcion, was an ideal vehicle through
62
which the Court could advance its FAA agenda.
56

Id. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor opined in Southland,
“One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts.” Id.
57
In a detailed account of the FAA’s history, Ian Macneil verifies O’Connor’s opinion, writing that Southland “is an Orwellian object lesson in the potential and often
actual unreliability of the legislative history of judges rationalizing results in cases.”
MACNEIL, supra note 40, at 144; see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 380
(describing the majority’s opinion in Southland as “an extraordinarily disingenuous
manipulation of the history of the 1925 Act”).
58
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59
See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing
his previous dissenting opinions in which he argues that the FAA does not apply to arbitration clauses being analyzed in state courts).
60
See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T v. Concepcion and Adherence to Minority Views, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/
atts-long-game-on-arbitration.html (exploring a range of possible outcomes the Court
might have reached regarding FAA preemption had Concepcion originated in state court).
61
See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T’s Long Game on Unconscionability, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5,
2011, 9:40 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/atts-long-gameon-unconscionability.html (“[C]ompanies trying to enforce the clauses filed plenty of
petitions . . . asking the Supreme Court to slam the door on unconscionability challenges.
They were all denied.”).
62
Id.
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Following Southland, the savings clause itself received much closer
scrutiny. In Perry v. Thomas, the Court again addressed the validity of a
California statute that authorized judicial determinations “without re63
gard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.” Given
the holding in Southland, the Court had no reservations about
64
preempting the state statute. Yet the Court’s dicta in Perry provided
an important explanation of the savings clause, an explanation that
would later factor prominently in the Court’s treatment of the Discover
Bank rule in Concepcion. In a footnote, the Perry Court emphasized
that when litigants use traditional state law defenses to revoke a contract, those principles—such as duress, fraud, or unconscionability—
65
must be applied uniformly to “any contract.” In other words, if a
state court’s unconscionability doctrine is applied differently to arbitration agreements than it is to other contracts, then the Supremacy
66
Clause requires that the FAA preempt the state court’s attempt to regulate the law of arbitrability.
Although the subject of class arbitration made fleeting appearances
67
in these early cases, the Court did not confront a question specifically
involving class procedures in arbitration until 2003 in Green Tree Finan68
cial Corp. v. Bazzle. Unfortunately, the Bazzle ruling yielded no majority
opinion and left several key questions unanswered. In Bazzle, the defendant argued that class arbitration was impermissible in a proceed69
ing that left it liable for over $20 million in statutory damages. Prior
to the Court’s review, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
class arbitration was permissible because the contracts were silent on
70
that subject. On appeal, instead of deciding whether class arbitration
could occur when contracts were silent, and rather than discussing the
practical consequences of class arbitration, the Court simply ruled that
63

482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
64
See id. at 491 (“[C]lear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California’s § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for
resolving wage disputes. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute must
give way.”).
65
Id. at 492 n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
66
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
67
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9 & n.4 (1984) (highlighting the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that imposing a class action structure on the arbitration was acceptable, but refusing to determine whether such a conclusion would be contrary to the FAA because the state supreme court had not reached this latter question).
68
539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
69
Id. at 449.
70
Id. at 450.
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the arbitrator, and not the court, should decide whether the parties in71
tended to permit class proceedings. Moreover, only a plurality of Jus72
73
tices joined the Bazzle holding, with four Justices dissenting and Jus74
tice Stevens concurring on alternate grounds.
During the 2009 Term, the Court finally took up the issue of class
75
arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. Picking
up where Bazzle left off, the Court took up the question of whether class
arbitration can be imposed on parties when the “arbitration clause [is]
76
77
‘silent’ on that issue.” Here, the Court decided it could not.
The arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen was part of a contract,
originally drafted in 1950, between several businesses and a group of
78
shipping companies. The agreement said nothing about class pro79
ceedings. In the arbitration literature, scholars have referred to such
an agreement as a “first-generation arbitration clause[]” because it included neither a class action waiver (as would a “second-generation
clause[]”) nor contractual provisions intended to make the arbitration
agreement seem more consumer-friendly (as would a “third-generation
80
clause[]”). Despite this silence, an arbitration panel in Stolt-Nielsen
had previously decided that class proceedings in arbitration would be
81
appropriate.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the panel, holding
that an arbitrator could decide “procedural questions which grow out
82
of the dispute,” but that class arbitration was not such a question. In

71

Id. at 452-53. Bruhl has characterized this decision as an example of “the ultimate trump card in the unconscionability game” because it allowed the Court both to
avoid ruling on a difficult question of state contract law and to avoid creating a federal
common law of contracts. Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1470, 1475-77.
72
539 U.S. at 447.
73
Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 454-56 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
76
Id. at 1764.
77
Id. at 1776-77.
78
Id. at 1764-65.
79
Id. at 1766.
80
Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1106.
81
130 S. Ct. at 1766.
82
Id. at 1775 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84
(2002)). It is uncertain whether Stolt-Nielsen overrules Bazzle. The majority in StoltNielsen noted that Bazzle only retained a plurality, id. at 1771-72, and—while it might be
a moot point after Concepcion—Stolt-Nielsen seems to open the door to future challenges
regarding whether courts or arbitrators should determine the parties’ intent in allowing
class arbitration. See John Elwood, After Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: Deciding
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Justice Alito’s majority opinion, the Court stressed that a “basic precept” of the FAA is that “arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coer83
cion.’” The Court then concluded that the arbitration agreement
did not exhibit any explicit or implied intent by the parties to consent
84
to class arbitration proceedings. On the issue of implied consent,
the Court stated that “class-action arbitration changes the nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties
85
consented to it.” Additionally, the Court explained that class proceedings would invite several “fundamental changes” to the arbitration by adjudicating the rights of absent parties and transforming the
86
dispute into a high-stakes showdown with limited judicial review.
As I will discuss in Part IV, this language from Stolt-Nielsen, which
Concepcion subsequently adopted, is difficult to reconcile with other
recent decisions involving aggregate proceedings. But while StoltNielsen’s statements controlled agreements that were silent on class arbitration, the holding did not address whether the doctrine of unconscionability could be used to invalidate class action waivers found
in second- and third-generation arbitration agreements. The next
Part will discuss several of the unconscionability cases that were brewing in the lower courts and that eventually prompted the Court to
grant certiorari in Concepcion.
II. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Although the Supreme Court had established in Southland and later cases that attempts by state legislatures to undercut the FAA would
be preempted, plaintiffs seeking to avoid the enforcement of their arbitration agreements still had a shield to use against defendants who
moved to compel arbitration. State courts were free to provide relief
based on the explicit terms of the savings clause. The savings clause
permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of

When Class Arbitration Is Permissible, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 27, 2010, 5:35 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/04/27/after-stolt-nielsen-v-animalfeeds-intl-corp-decidingwhen-class-arbitration-is-permissible (noting that Stolt-Nielsen and Bazzle fail to resolve
the question of whether the arbitrator or the court decides if an agreement permits
class arbitration).
83
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
84
Id. at 1775.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1776.
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87

generally applicable contract defenses. Recognizing this fact, plaintiffs argued that class action waivers were unconscionable because their
use in contracts of adhesion increased the chances that businesses
would avoid liability for consumer fraud or employment discrimination
88
in the small claims setting. Ultimately, state and circuit courts divided
on the unconscionability issue, with the courts of up to twenty states
89
constructing barriers against businesses’ use of these waivers.
A. Unconscionability in the Lower Courts
Unconscionability, a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for
90
the revocation of any contract,” is a common law principle that differs from state to state. As with any common law contract doctrine, it
requires a fact-specific inquiry. Therefore, the disparities among
91
courts on the issue of class action waivers are not surprising. Nevertheless, almost all courts subscribe to several common principles of
unconscionability. For example, the defending party usually must
prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability—with the
procedural aspect relating to defects in the bargaining and the subs92
tantive aspect relating to harsh or one-sided terms. Also, courts often apply a sliding scale approach, meaning that the more procedurally unconscionable a contractual provision is, the less substantively
93
unconscionable it must be, and vice versa. In light of these common
principles, as we will see, varying attitudes toward class actions, not differing approaches to unconscionability, best explain the disparate results across states and circuits.
California pioneered the use of unconscionability to protect individuals from class action waivers. One of the earliest invalidations of a
87

See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 65.
See supra note 13.
89
Brief for Respondents at 1, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292, at *1; see also id. app. at 1a-3a (listing the twenty
states and corresponding decisions that have invalidated class action waivers).
90
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
91
One reason courts have not applied the doctrine uniformly is that they have
struggled to develop an exact definition for unconscionability. One commentator has
noted, “That the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and
weakness.” 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 581 (3d ed. 2004).
Unconscionability, however, is commonly defined as “an absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.” Id. at 582 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
Id. at 582-88.
93
Id. at 585.
88
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class action waiver occurred in Szetela v. Discover Bank. In Szetela, the
California Court of Appeals found that the class action waiver at issue
was procedurally unconscionable because it was offered on a “take it or
95
leave it” basis. Furthermore, the Szetela court held that “[t]he manifest
one-sidedness . . . [was] blindingly obvious” because the class action
96
waiver would certainly not harm the defendant, Discover Bank. Not
only was the provision unconscionable, but it was also against public
policy because it granted Discover Bank “a ‘get out of jail free’ card
97
while compromising important consumer rights.” In other words, the
inclusion of the waiver undermined a consumer’s right to have his deceptive business practices claim adjudicated. Notably, the appeals court
did not face an FAA preemption challenge in the case.
Three years later, the California Supreme Court decided the seminal case on the issue of unconscionability and laid down the threepart test that the Ninth Circuit subsequently used in Concepcion. In
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the court held that, in at least some in98
stances, class action waivers are unconscionable.
Specifically, the
court acknowledged that “[c]lass action and arbitration waivers are
not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses,” that is clauses that would re99
lieve the defendants from liability. The Discover Bank court nevertheless concluded that, in practice, these waivers are “indisputably one100
sided.” The court then laid out its three-part test, holding that class
action waivers are unconscionable under California law if (1) “the
waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion”; (2) the setting
“predictably involve[s] small damages”; and (3) “it is alleged that the
party with superior bargaining power has [attempted] to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
101
Under these conditions, the Court reasoned, the agreemoney.”
94

118 Cal Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 867.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 868.
98
113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). The dispute in Discover Bank involved claims
by credit cardholders who had been charged late fees. Id. at 1103. Although the cardholders made payments on the specified day, they did not make them by a certain unspecified time—a time which the credit card company used to assess fees. Id.
99
Id. at 1108.
100
Id. at 1109.
101
Id. at 1110. The court explained that the waiver, by satisfying these three criteria,
violated the state’s prohibition against “contract clauses that are contrary to public policy.” Id. at 1108; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2009) (“All contracts which have for
their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether
95
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ment violated the state’s statutory provisions against unconscionable
and exculpatory contracts, noting additionally that “class actions and
arbitrations are . . . inextricably linked to the vindication of substan102
tive rights.”
In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court also reversed the
appeals court’s conclusion that the FAA preempted California’s policy
103
regarding class action waivers.
The court explained that “the principle that class action waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable . . . does not specifically apply to arbitration agreements,
104
but to contracts generally.” For support, the court cited its decision
105
in America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, which also found a class ac106
tion waiver unenforceable, though outside the arbitration context.
As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its explanation of the savings clause in Perry, warned against discriminatory applications of gen107
eral contract principles to arbitration agreements. But because the
America Online case showed that California’s unconscionability test was
not limited to the arbitration context, the admonition in Perry would
presumably not apply. Thus, under this interpretation, the unconscionability test in Discover Bank would fall squarely into the acceptable
parameters of the savings clause.
Finally, the Discover Bank court commented on the use of class arbitration. Although class arbitration is not an optimal form of dispute
resolution, the court said it “must be evaluated, not in relation to some
108
ideal but in relation to its alternatives.”
In other words, while class
arbitration may have its flaws, if the alternative is to foreclose consumer
rights, then courts must consider compelling class arbitration.
Although several other state courts had invalidated similar class ac109
tion waivers before Discover Bank, many courts adopted the California
willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”). California law also includes a statutory prohibition against unconscionable contracts. See id. § 1670.5 (allowing courts to
“limit the application of any unconscionable clause”).
102
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109.
103
Id. at 1110.
104
Id. at 1112.
105
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Ct. App. 2001).
106
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1106-07, 1112.
107
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
108
Id. at 1116 (quoting Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982),
rev’d sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
109
See, e.g., Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 538-39 (Ala. 2002) (invalidating a class action waiver in a termite protection contract); State ex rel. Dunlap v.
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 282-84 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a class action waiver in an insurance contract unenforceable).
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110

Supreme Court’s reasoning after the ruling. Some state courts have
gone to even greater lengths to show that they will find a class action
waiver unconscionable only if it is indeed exculpatory. For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a class action waiver involving small claims on the same day it enforced a provision involving no
111
small claims. This is not to say that state and federal courts have uniformly invalidated class action waivers, however. Numerous states and
circuits have enforced the waivers pursuant to the explicit terms of the
112
arbitration agreement without regard to the size of the claim.
In addition to the decisions that view class action waivers “through
113
the prism of state unconscionability law,” several circuit courts have
utilized a somewhat different analysis, albeit one that produces essentially the same result. Rather than apply state contract law principles,
these circuits have analyzed the friction between class action waivers
and statutes that rely primarily on private enforcement and class ac114
tions to achieve public policy goals, such as the Sherman Act. While
several circuits have found that class action waivers do not conflict
115
with the statutory schemes at issue, both the First and Second Cir110

See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 984 (9th
Cir. 2007) (applying Discover Bank’s three-part test to Cingular’s class arbitration waiver
and finding it “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable”); Scott v. Cingular
Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (finding that the “class action is often the
only effective way to halt and redress . . . exploitation” of consumers by companies
(quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1105)).
111
Compare Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99101 (N.J. 2006) (invalidating the waiver at issue where each plaintiff’s claim was so
small that it was unlikely that individuals would bring suit), with Delta Funding Corp. v.
Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. 2006) (upholding a waiver in a suit for over $100,000 in
damages in which the plaintiff had “adequate incentive” to bring an individual suit).
112
See supra note 20; see also, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369
(3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the right to bring a class action can be contractually
waived); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 143-45 (Me. 2005) (enforcing a class action
ban under Texas law and determining that the “one-sided aspects of the arbitration
provision [do not] render it unconscionable”); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d
735, 750-51 (Md. 2005) (upholding a class action ban under Maryland law and noting
the “strong policy, made clear in both federal and Maryland law, that favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements”).
113
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006).
114
See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 196-98 (2d Cir. 2011)
(highlighting the importance of class actions for plaintiffs vindicating their rights under antitrust statutes).
115
See, e.g., Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir.
2004) (enforcing a class action waiver in a dispute involving claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the waiver “deprive[d] them
of substantial rights guaranteed by [that Act]”); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (enforcing a waiver in a dispute involving
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cuits have invalidated class action waivers using a “statutory rights
116
analysis.”
Under this analysis, courts refuse to enforce class action
waivers if the foreseeable result is plaintiffs’ inability to vindicate their
statutory rights in arbitration. For instance, in an antitrust suit, if class
proceedings are not available, then a plaintiff’s claim could be costprohibitive because of the great expense of hiring an economist as an
expert witness. On these facts, the Second Circuit declared a class ac117
tion waiver unenforceable. As Part V will explain, cases relying on a
statutory rights analysis appear to survive the Concepcion decision.
B. Pre-Concepcion Commentary and the Procedure/Substance Divide
Before the Court granted certiorari in Concepcion, courts striking
down class action waivers had been the subject of critical reviews in
118
the arbitration literature. Nevertheless, these early criticisms began
to shed light on how courts were incorporating state aggregation policies—policies relating to the aggregation of claimants in a class action
or collective action—into their rulings.
Despite the California Supreme Court’s assertion that its rule
against unconscionable class action waivers applied generally to all
contracts and not just arbitration agreements, several commentators
claim that the California courts were not actually practicing what they
preached. For example, Michael McGuinness and Adam Karr contend
that the California courts were applying a “heightened standard of un119
conscionability in the arbitration context” and that they “ha[d] taken
120
the FAA’s ‘savings clause’ where no court ha[d] gone before.” While
Truth in Lending Act claims and finding “no limitations upon the substantive remedies available to [the plaintiff] in arbitration”).
116
See, e.g., In re Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 197-99 (invalidating a class action waiver
as inconsistent with the Sherman and Clayton Acts because it “preclude[d] plaintiffs
from enforcing their statutory rights”); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59, 61 (invalidating a class
action waiver on the basis that Comcast would be “essentially shielded from private
consumer antitrust enforcement liability” if the agreement were upheld).
117
See In re Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 197-98 (“[T]he cost of plaintiffs’ individually
arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”).
118
See, e.g., Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach
to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 78 (arguing that California courts were “accomplish[ing] what the FAA commands cannot be done . . . all
under the guise of a ‘generally applicable contract defense’” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996))).
119
Id. at 81.
120
Id. at 62.
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the authors limited their analysis primarily to employment disputes,
they concluded that the California courts were demonstrating an anti121
quated form of hostility toward arbitration agreements.
Such arguments may also have empirical support. Stephen
Broome’s analysis of California Courts of Appeal cases from 1982 to
2006 found that unconscionability challenges to provisions in arbitration agreements were about five times more successful than uncon122
scionability challenges in the nonarbitration context.
He argues
that during this time, the California courts strayed from their tradi123
tional “shock[s] the conscience” analysis. However, Professor AaronAndrew Bruhl countered such evidence by arguing that this aggregate
data may indicate that the arbitration agreements at issue were indeed
124
much more one-sided than other agreements.
Although these studies do not delve into great detail about aggregation policies, they suggest that courts are intertwining policy decisions regarding class actions with these unconscionability analyses.
The intermingling of substantive and procedural policy discussions by
the courts is not necessarily undesirable. Rather, perhaps it is scholars’ dismay with this intermingling that should cause concern. For
instance, Broome writes, “The California courts presume that the pro125
cedural limitation will have substantive consequences.”
Likewise,
Professor Richard Nagareda argues that although “nominally cast in
terms of unconscionability, the court’s analysis [in Discover Bank] ulti-

121

See id. at 61 (“[T]he same judicial hostility ostensibly thwarted eighty years ago
continues today, albeit in a more subtle—but equally hostile—form.”).
122
Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 39, 44-48 (2006). Broome’s research showed that “unconscionability challenges succeeded in about fifty-eight percent of cases in the arbitration context,” whereas such challenges in the nonarbitration context “succeeded only eleven percent of
the time.” Id. at 47-48.
123
Id. at 53 (quoting Hicks v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 714 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
See Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1457 (“The fact that arbitration agreements were
more often held unconscionable may simply reflect the fact that during the relevant
period they really were, on average, more unfair than other types of challenged agreements . . . .”).
125
Broome, supra note 122, at 57. Some judges have also voiced skepticism about
the effect of class action waivers on substantive rights. See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n N.D., 693 N.W.2d 918, 927 (N.D. 2005) (reasoning that these waivers are
not unconscionable because the plaintiff “retains all substantive remedies he would
otherwise have without the ‘no class action’ provision”).
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mately speaks to the distortion that a foreclosure of aggregation might
126
work . . . upon underlying substantive law.”
But, as I will explain in more detail in Part IV, this is exactly what
127
state courts should be authorized to do.
Because class action decisions are often deeply rooted in substantive regulatory policies, neither the contract nor the FAA should limit a state in furthering its
regulation of arbitration agreements in the small claims setting. In
Concepcion, the Court finally had the opportunity both to resolve the
class action waiver debate and to provide a candid discussion about
the practical effect that class actions have on substantive rights and
liabilities. The Court, however, failed to produce.
III. AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION : THE FAA AND
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS COLLIDE
For the past decade, scholars have speculated as to how our nation’s highest court would eventually resolve the class action waiver
128
The Court’s decision to intervene was a foregone concludebate.
sion—after all, lower courts’ unconscionability rulings and their heavy
reliance on the FAA’s savings clause seemed to deviate starkly from
the Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration. But as one scholar had
noted, the “pro-arbitration Supreme Court [found] itself in the posi129
tion of having picked most of the low-hanging anti-arbitration fruit.”
In Southland, for example, once the Court decided that the FAA
should apply in state courts, its invalidation of the state legislature’s
130
blatant attempt to flout the FAA was a fairly simple task. Judicial circumventions of the FAA, on the other hand, are harder to identify.
Surely, the Court did not want to appear as if it was second-guessing
state contract law principles. This hesitation may explain why the

126

Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1901 (2006).
127
Certainly, there is a further question about the appropriate allocation of policy
discussions between state courts and state legislatures. However, state-level separationsof-powers concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment.
128
See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1464-88 (proposing several strategies that the
Supreme Court could use were it to grant certiorari to a lower court’s unconscionability
ruling); Wilson, supra note 48, at 791-92 (providing four hypothetical holdings for a
case like Concepcion).
129
Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1467.
130
See id. (explaining that the Southland decision “involved relatively clear questions of federal law”).
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Court, over the last decade, has rejected dozens of certiorari petitions
131
challenging lower court unconscionability rulings.
Then along came the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Concepcion, and
with it, an ideal set of facts for the Court to continue its predictable
path in FAA cases. This Part will briefly summarize the facts underlying the Concepcion dispute and then discuss the Court’s views regarding the enforceability of AT&T’s class action waiver. As I will explain,
the Court, in siding with AT&T—a company that prompts its custom132
ers to “rethink possible” —first considered, and then severely limited, the possibilities open to states that want to incorporate class
proceedings into their regulatory policies.
A. Background of the Case
The underlying dispute in Concepcion centers on a cellular phone
contract between Vincent and Liza Concepcion and AT&T Mobility.
The Concepcions purchased cell phone service from AT&T and re133
Though the
ceived two new cell phones as part of the agreement.
Concepcions did not have to pay for the phones themselves, AT&T
134
charged them $30.22 in sales tax for the new devices. In response,
the Concepcions brought a claim in the Southern District of California and asserted that AT&T’s advertisements for “free” phones were
135
fraudulent. The case was later consolidated with a putative class ac136
tion against AT&T involving the same issues. AT&T then moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the
137
parties.
At its core, the arbitration agreement between the Concepcions
and AT&T was similar to the agreements at issue in previous California cases, such as Szetela and Discover Bank. The cell phone contract’s
arbitration clause and class action waiver read as follows: “You and
AT&T agree that each may bring claims against the other only in your
or its individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any

131

See id. at 1466 (“Since 2000, there have been dozens of petitions . . . yet the
court let them pass by . . . .”).
132
The Network of Possibilities, AT&T, http://www.att.com/rethinkpossible (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011).
133
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 1744-45.
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purported class or representative proceeding.”
Unlike the firstgeneration arbitration clause in Stolt-Nielsen, this agreement explicitly
referenced class proceedings and could at first blush be referred to as
139
a second-generation arbitration clause.
Yet the arbitration clause in Concepcion is more accurately categorized as a third-generation arbitration clause, because it “attempt[s] to
respond in various ways to the lower-court invalidations of second140
generation clauses.”
What was this attempted response? AT&T in141
cluded “consumer-friendly” provisions that supposedly altered the
cost calculation for plaintiffs. These additional provisions included,
but were not limited to, a $7500 payment if the arbitration award exceeded the last written settlement offer AT&T made prior to selecting
an arbitrator; cost-free arbitration for nonfrivolous claims; double attorneys’ fees if the arbitrator awarded the customer more than
AT&T’s last settlement offer; and the option of conducting the arbi142
tration in person, over the phone, or solely on the filed papers.
Although AT&T claimed that the addition of “consumer-friendly”
provisions would help consumers bring low-value claims to arbitra143
tion, the clauses were almost certainly a strategic move by AT&T to
avoid state unconscionability rulings and to strengthen its position on
appeal. In fact, when AT&T’s codefendants petitioned for the Court
to grant certiorari in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, a 2007 case involving
a second-generation provision, AT&T filed an amicus brief requesting
144
that the Court deny its codefendants’ petition. The amicus brief explained that AT&T had developed a new arbitration clause and that
Laster was “a less than ideal vehicle for addressing whether States may
145
Thus, as one commentator has
refuse to enforce class waivers.”
noted, AT&T’s long-term litigation strategy enabled it to return to the
Court in 2010 with a “much less messy case” based on “the right set of
146
facts.”
138

Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 3.
See supra text accompanying note 80.
140
Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1106.
141
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting Makarowski v. AT&T Mobility,
LLC, No. 09-1590, 2009 WL 1765661, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009)).
142
Id. at 5-7.
143
Id. at 5.
144
See Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 4-7, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976), 2008 WL
534808, at *4-7.
145
Id. at 21.
146
Bruhl, supra note 61.
139
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Both the district and circuit courts held that AT&T’s thirdgeneration class action waiver was unenforceable. Although the district court initially found that the provisions in the arbitration agreement were an “adequate substitute” for consumers seeking class arbitration, it ultimately concluded that it had to invalidate the waiver
147
Applying the Discover Bank
because of deterrence considerations.
test, the district court reasoned that some putative class members
might be unaware of any attempt to defraud consumers and that,
148
without class proceedings, an adequate deterrent effect was lacking.
149
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In particular, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the potential for a $7500 premium payment ac150
On this issue, the
tually altered the cost equation for plaintiffs.
court reasoned that “the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle
151
Realistically,
of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.”
AT&T would simply pay the face value of a claim rather than proceed
152
to arbitration and face the likelihood of a $7500 liability. The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that preemption was not warranted because
the Discover Bank rule was “simply a refinement of the unconscionabil153
ity analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.”
With this record in front of the Court, the Justices had several options. For instance, the Court could have deferred to California’s decision to incorporate the availability of class proceedings into its regulatory policy. More generally, the Justices could have decided that this
issue required them to wade too far into the intricacies of California’s
contract law and its unconscionability doctrine. Relying on federalism
principles would presumably have been appealing to Justice Scalia.
After all, it was he who wrote in a case involving a state’s choice-of-law
rules that the Court should leave such rules to the states, given that
there was “no compass to guide [the Court] beyond [its] own percep154
But the Court balked at both of
tions of what seems desirable.”

147

Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *10-14 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
148
Id. at *12-13.
149
Laster, 584 F.3d at 852.
150
Id. at 855-56.
151
Id. at 856.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 857 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976,
987 (9th Cir. 2007)).
154
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988).
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these options and instead intruded on the states’ prerogative to formulate class action policies.
B. The Concepcion Opinions
155

Like other recent FAA cases, Concepcion was a 5-4 decision. Not
surprisingly, the votes divided along traditional ideological lines, with
the Justices volleying arguments about the FAA and the state’s role in
shaping arbitration procedures.
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia frames his analysis by reiterating the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of con156
tract.” He then discusses the Court’s historical interpretation of the
savings clause, focusing specifically on Perry’s prohibition of discriminatory applications of state contract defenses such as unconscionabili157
ty, and warning that “the act cannot be held to destroy itself.” With
these standards in place, Scalia reasons that even if the Discover Bank
rule applied to “any” contract—and not just arbitration agreements—
“the rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agree158
As support, Justice Scalia references Broome’s article on
ments.”
unconscionability statistics in California, albeit with the disclaimer
159
Justice Scalia’s opinion also
that the statistics are “not definitive.”
suggests that if the Court were to allow states to condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class proceedings, then it would be obliged to allow states to demand other proce160
dures in arbitration, such as judicially monitored discovery.
After critiquing the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia moves to a
discussion of class arbitration, picking up where Justice Alito left off in
Stolt-Nielsen. Here, Justice Scalia reiterates that the shift from individual to class proceedings introduces changes that are “fundamental,”
including the introduction of absent parties, different procedures,
161
and higher stakes.
He then explains that class arbitration would

155

Both Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), and 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), were 5-4 decisions.
156
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting RentA-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2276) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157
Id. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-228
(1998)).
158
Id. at 1747.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1750 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1776 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“greatly increase[] risks to defendants” and reasons that this risk will
force defendants to accept “in terrorem” settlements of questionable
162
claims. Finally, the majority opinion concludes with a brief discussion of the claim-disabling effect of class action waivers in the small
claims setting. But on this point, Justice Scalia gives short shrift to the
Concepcions’ argument, stating that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unre163
lated reasons.”
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which he relies
more closely on the text of the FAA than does Justice Scalia. According to Justice Thomas, Congress’s use of the word “revocation” in the
savings clause and its “conspicuous omission of ‘invalidation’ and
‘nonenforcement,’” indicate that the savings clause carves out an ex164
Because the
ception for some, but not all, state contract defenses.
Discover Bank rule was more akin to a rule prohibiting contracts
against public policy, and not one that dealt with the making of the
arbitration agreement, Justice Thomas concludes that the savings
165
Thus, under his interpretation,
clause does not protect that rule.
the Discover Bank rule warrants preemption.
In dissent, Justice Breyer attacks several of Justice Scalia’s propositions. On the facts, he asserts that the Discover Bank rule is not necessarily discriminatory toward class action waivers and cites various cases
in which courts have upheld class action waivers under California law,
166
despite unconscionability challenges.
On the FAA more generally,
Justice Breyer also questions Justice Scalia’s assumption that a “fundamental attribute” of arbitration is its individualized, not class, na167
Nothing in the FAA’s history, Justice Breyer contends, supture.
168
ports this conclusion.
Furthermore, Justice Breyer provides a defense of the Ninth Circuit’s view of the incentives to file suit in the small claims setting. Invoking Judge Richard Posner’s famous quote that “only a lunatic or a
fanatic sues for $30,” Justice Breyer explains that class proceedings
can provide countervailing advantages to the parties, particularly
162

Id. at 1752.
Id. at 1753.
164
Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165
Id. at 1756.
166
Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Walnut Producers of Cal. v. Diamond Foods, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 459-62 (Ct. App. 2010)).
167
Id. at 1759.
168
Id.
163
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169

plaintiffs. Justice Breyer, however, only briefly addresses the role of
states in formulating aggregation policies by asking the majority,
“[w]hy is this kind of decision—weighing the pros and cons of all class
170
Ultimately, with an
proceedings alike—not California’s to make?”
uncharacteristic recitation of federalist principles, Justice Breyer concludes that the majority has run afoul of the federalism goals con171
tained in the FAA’s savings clause.
C. An Initial Critique of the Reasoning in Concepcion
By and large, the initial response to Concepcion among policymakers, media outlets, and the legal community was negative. Several
commentators, for example, lambasted the Court for its “devastating
blow to consumer rights,” and Justice Scalia, in particular, for the “se172
lective nature of his brand of originalism.”
In contrast, some commentators welcomed the opinion, claiming that Concepcion was a step
in the right direction in a world in which plaintiffs’ attorneys have exploited the claims of class members with injustices such as coupon set173
This Section will offer a brief critique of several of the
tlements.
opinion’s key points before explaining the larger doctrinal problems
with the Court’s views of class actions in Part IV.
The Court’s “Contract” Approach. On the surface, the majority’s approach constitutes an emphatic promotion of contract autonomy. Indeed, the thrust of the Court’s class arbitration criticisms is based on
the idea that the defendants would not have willingly agreed to arbi-

169

Id. at 1761 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1762.
172
Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26; see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Supreme Court: Class (Action) Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2011,
at A11, available at 2011 WLNR 9250480 (contending that, after Concepcion, it is “increasingly a myth that an injured person can sue”).
173
See, e.g., Lawrence W. Schonbrun, Supreme Court Ruling Is Not Bad News for Consumers, the Class Action System Is the Real Culprit, HUFFPOST POLITICS (May 19, 2011, 2:42
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-w-schonbrun/supreme-court-ruling-isn_b_862491.html (“Consumers need real protection from nefarious corporate behavior, not the class action runaround that only benefits the lawyers.”). The term “coupon settlement” refers to class action settlements that award class members worthless
coupons, which are rarely redeemed, and that award class counsel generous attorneys’
fees. For a discussion of the social legitimacy problems emerging from these settlements and the resulting political pressures for Congress, see David Marcus, Response,
Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
157, 164-66 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-2011/Marcus.pdf.
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trate if they knew they could be subject to the disadvantages of class
174
proceedings. But contract autonomy is a two-way street. Practically
speaking, the Court’s enforcement of AT&T’s class action waiver can
hardly be construed as promoting autonomy because, like most class
action waivers, it was contained in a contract of adhesion. In fact, in
explaining the scope of the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia states that
“the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than ad175
hesive are long past.” This concession is rather puzzling in light of
176
Furthermore, even if the authe FAA’s contract-promoting goals.
tonomy of both parties is enhanced, Concepcion steers the Court closer
to its Lochner-era jurisprudence, in which the Court often prioritized
177
economic liberty over sensible and socially desirable regulation.
Class actions can help further such regulation. But after Concepcion,
states have limited power to incorporate class proceedings into their
regulatory structures.
The Scope of the FAA’s Savings Clause. There is no question that an
overly expansive reading of the savings clause could threaten to “de178
stroy [the Act] itself.”
The problem, though, is that the majority
uses this admonition to justify its broad-sweeping and overinclusive
FAA principles. As one scholar explained before the Concepcion decision, a “remarkable aspect of the [Court’s FAA jurisprudence] is its
formalism: it does not matter why a state . . . singles out arbitration,
179
just that it does so.” Perhaps the Court’s FAA approach could yield
better results if it examined whether the state rule “rest[s] on generalizations about arbitration’s inadequacy as a dispute resolution
180
Unfortunately, the current approach is more of an
process.”

174

See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (“We find it hard to believe that defendants
would bet the company with no effective means of review . . . .”).
175
Id. at 1750.
176
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence:
How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts 40 (George Wash. Univ. Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 547, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1809005
(“[T]he Court [in Concepcion] commits contradictions that manifest a lack of understanding of contract law and even life. Most strikingly: on one page Justice Scalia observes that consumer contracts are totally ‘adhesive’ today yet on the very next page
strikes the California law because the aggregate actions it ordains are not ‘consensual.’” (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51)).
177
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 62021 (3d ed. 2006).
178
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S.
214, 227-28 (1998)); see also supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179
Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1248.
180
Id. at 1297.
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181

“on/off” switch —the mere fact that the state rule can be interpreted
182
as “singl[ing] out” arbitration is enough for the Court to preempt.
Concepcion exemplifies this approach. Thus, in light of the Court’s invalidation of the Discover Bank rule, it is now of seemingly no consequence that a state, New Jersey in this instance, invalidated a class action waiver on the same day it upheld another outside the small claims
183
Unfortunately, the Court completely disregarded whether
setting.
the invalidation of the waiver may have been “desirable for unrelated
184
reasons,” such as the avoidance of a class action waiver’s claimdisabling effect.
Fixing Problems in the Class Action System. Admittedly, supporters of
class action waivers like that in Concepcion correctly note that the class
185
action system is far from perfect.
“Entrepreneurial plaintiff’s attor186
ney[s]” have been criticized—perhaps justifiably—for their abuses of
the system, including their attempts to maximize attorneys’ fees at the
187
expense of the class. But is the Court’s enforcement of a class action
waiver, which effectively strips consumers of an aggregate remedy, really
a good solution to these problems? Certainly not. Legislative reform,
such as Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
188
(CAFA), can help cure some of class action’s ills. Furthermore, scholars have considered tweaks to the current fee regime that could per-

181

Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1247.
183
See supra note 111 and accompanying text (summarizing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning in these two cases).
184
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
185
For example, class action reform could help enhance judicial economy and
fairness to the litigants. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 75, 102 (“Academics as well as corporate
interests have pointed to ethical and efficiency issues and have urged that class actions
be limited or reformed, if not eliminated.”).
186
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1987).
187
See id. at 882-96 (detailing the divergent incentives that motivate plaintiffs’ attorneys and plaintiffs in class action litigation). But see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103-05 (2006) (arguing, in opposition to Coffee, that class
action opponents improperly focus on fairness considerations, such as whether “plaintiffs’ lawyers are being overcompensated,” instead of on the more important issue of
whether class action litigation deters undesirable behavior by defendants).
188
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)). CAFA
expanded federal court jurisdiction over class actions, in part to reduce forum shopping
and the effects of plaintiff-friendly state courts.
182
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189

haps effectuate better results.
While none of these reforms is foolproof, each is certainly a better way of handling problems within the
class action system than removing the availability of class proceedings
altogether.
State Preferences for Other Procedures in Arbitration. As noted earlier,
the majority in Concepcion was concerned that if it allowed states to require the availability of class arbitration, then it would be obliged to allow states to require other procedures, such as judicially monitored dis190
covery. This is a fair point—one that the Concepcions had difficulty
191
refuting. Nevertheless, discovery procedures do not exhibit the same
claim-enabling effects as class actions. Surely, the costs of discovery
procedures influence the parties and, in extreme situations, can factor
into a party’s decision to either go forward with or settle a claim. But as
the Discover Bank court recognized—and as I will explain in more detail
in Part IV—class actions are “inextricably linked” to substantive regula192
In some cases, this holds true from the policy’s inceptory policies.
193
tion. That the Concepcions could not distinguish how class proceedings differ from procedures like judicially monitored discovery only
underscores how important it is for the Court to provide a candid discussion about the practical effects of class proceedings.
IV. CLASS ACTION POLICY IN THE WAKE OF
CONCEPCION AND SHADY GROVE
Concepcion was indeed a crossroads for the class action. Policies relating to this form of aggregate proceeding had come a long way since
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, which revolutionized the modern
194
But during the 2009 Term, the Court created some
class action.

189

See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2043, 2047 (2010) (proposing that class action lawyers in small-stakes actions should
receive one-hundred percent of the class’s recovery so as to “fully incentiviz[e] class action
lawyers to bring as many cost-justified actions as possible”); see also Marcus, supra note
173, at 163-66 (challenging Fitzpatrick’s utilitarian proposal and suggesting that it may
overlook legitimacy benefits that emerge from a smaller attorney fee reward).
190
See supra text accompanying note 160.
191
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (questioning the Concepcions’ contention that cases involving other procedures would be a “far
cry” from the instant case involving class arbitration).
192
See supra text accompanying note 102.
193
For an example, see infra text accompanying note 233.
194
For a discussion of the 1966 amendments and their effects on class actions, see
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1484-89 (2008).
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doctrinal confusion in two cases analyzing class proceedings. In Shady
Grove, the Court held that Rule 23 preempted a state’s attempt to limit
aggregate remedies in court, and in so doing, wrote that class actions
195
Four weeks
only have “incidental effect[s]” on substantive rights.
later, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court seemed to change its view toward class
actions—at least in the arbitration context—by holding that an arbitration panel’s decision to allow aggregate remedies in arbitration
would “fundamental[ly] change” proceedings “to such a degree” that
196
the consent of the two parties could not be presumed.
With Concepcion, another class arbitration case, on the docket last
Term, the Court had the opportunity to resolve this confusion by either distinguishing the two lines of reasoning or revisiting its flawed
analysis in Shady Grove. But the majority failed to seize the opportunity; instead, it blindly followed the language in Stolt-Nielsen and perhaps
only added to the confusion by treating the rights of plaintiffs and defendants differently within the same opinion. This Part will discuss
this troubling development within class action policy. It will also offer
a critique of one scholar’s attempt to reconcile these two lines of reasoning by showing that such a reconciliation requires a strained reading of Stolt-Nielsen and a reliance on Shady Grove’s shortcomings. Ultimately, clarity from the Court is needed in order to explain the class
action’s unique role as both a procedural mechanism and a vindicator
of substantive rights.
A. Shady Grove and the “Incidental Effects” on Substantive Rights
Lest there be confusion about the implications of a case like Shady
Grove, it is important to begin by clarifying how these three cases differ. Shady Grove did not involve the FAA; rather, it implicated a Rules
197
Enabling Act (REA) challenge and is perhaps the most important
decision addressing the Erie doctrine since Gasperini v. Center for Hu198
manities, Inc. In contrast, neither Concepcion nor Stolt-Nielsen involved
an REA challenge, but instead considered the preemptive force of the
195

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443
(2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445
(1946)).
196
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010).
197
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). The REA provides that all state and federal laws “in conflict with” the “general rules of practice and procedure” in federal courts are void. Id.
198
518 U.S. 415 (1996). In Gasperini, the Supreme Court held that the lower court
should have applied New York’s standard governing excessive jury verdicts in a federal
diversity case, as doing so would not have violated the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 419.
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FAA. Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis in Shady Grove was the source
of an important point of disagreement between the parties in Concepcion because of a single unifying fiber—the class action.
Shady Grove involved a class action against Allstate Insurance in the
Eastern District of New York for Allstate’s alleged failure to pay a statutory penalty on late benefits payments that were due to health care
199
providers. The named plaintiff, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
claimed that it had received late payments for orthopedic services covered under one of Allstate’s auto insurance policies, but that it had
not received a statutorily prescribed two percent monthly interest fee
200
from the insurer. In response, Allstate pointed the court’s attention
to section 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, which
provided that “an action to recover a penalty . . . may not be maintained as a class action” unless the statute creating the penalty in201
The New York insurance statute
cludes an express authorization.
202
that prescribed the two percent fee included no such authorization.
Because this class action was a diversity suit in federal court, the
New York court rule would not automatically resolve the issue unless
the rule was considered substantive, rather than procedural, in nature.
Thus, the Court was faced with the following Erie question: whether,
in a federal diversity suit, Rule 23 should supersede a state law that
203
appeared to set policy on the availability of aggregate remedies. Although section 901(b) seemed to be a calculated attempt by the New
York legislature to limit the substantive liabilities of defendants in sta204
tutory penalty suits, its insertion into a collection of civil procedural
rules no doubt muddled the issue.
Intertwined with this question was an ancillary inquiry into the validity of Rule 23 itself. In order for Rule 23 to be found valid under
205
the REA, the rule would have to “really regulate[] procedure” and
overcome the REA’s prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge
199

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37.
Id. at 1436.
201
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2010).
202
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2010).
203
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
204
See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 69-70 (“[T]his limitation on aggregate
liability in New York ‘was the result of a compromise among competing interests’ that
arose from concerns among prodefendant groups that the aggregation of penalties
would lead to gross and destructive overenforcement.” (quoting Sperry v. Crompton
Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007))).
205
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941)).
200
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206

or modify any substantive right.” Although the invalidation of Rule
23—a rule that has allowed an enormous number of plaintiffs to bring
collective actions in federal court—seems unfathomable, the argu207
ment for invalidation maintains some legitimacy. Previously, on the
topic of class actions and substantive rights, Professor Stephen Burbank has suggested that “[i]t is difficult to conclude, other than
through a wooden analysis . . . that the advent of the small claims
208
(negative value) class action did not ‘alter substantive law.’” Rule 23
might still be valid, but the Court’s analysis would have to be sophisticated enough both to preserve Rule 23 and still leave room for state
class action policy decisions. Instead, in Shady Grove, the Court served
209
Ultimately, a plurality of the
up a “wooden” analysis of Rule 23.
Court concluded that, under a Hanna analysis, Rule 23 is valid and
supersedes section 901(b) in federal court, leaving the defendant po210
tentially liable for the statutory penalties.
The most contentious portion of the plurality’s analysis explained
that class proceedings are simply a matter of procedure, and nothing
more:
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species),
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at
once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional joinder, it leaves the
parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.
. . . The likelihood that some (even many) plaintiffs will be induced to
sue by the availability of a class action is just the sort of “incidental effec[t]”
211
we have long held does not violate § 2072(b) [of the REA].

Yet this reasoning seems to be at odds with Stolt-Nielsen’s and Concepcion’s language about the fundamental changes that class proceedings
introduce. As Professor Richard Nagareda points out, “The formida-

206

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 19 (describing the argument for Rule
23’s invalidation as “increasingly compelling” but noting that “the disruptive consequences of such a conclusion would be unacceptable”).
208
Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1928 (2006) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 126, at
1877).
209
See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 41.
210
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437-38, 1442-44. The Court’s analysis followed that
of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-74 (1965), which states that under a traditional
Erie analysis, if there is an applicable federal rule on point and no substantial variation
between the state and federal rule, then the court should apply the federal rule.
211
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 455 (1946)).
207
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ble claim-enabling effect of class treatment that the Shady Grove Court
deems incidental in litigation becomes a fundamental difference in
212
Viewed together, these two cases exhibit a bit of
Stolt-Nielsen . . . .”
doctrinal confusion regarding the correct treatment of aggregate proceedings and cannot be reconciled without ignoring the practical realities of class proceedings.
B. Reconciling Shady Grove with the FAA Cases . . . or Not
An analysis of the reasoning underlying these opposing views on
aggregate proceedings illustrates why Concepcion is critically flawed. Facially, the two lines of decisions do involve different mechanisms—class
litigation on the one hand, which has been refined through countless
iterations in the courts, and class arbitration on the other hand, which
is far from a tested formula. The doctrinal problems exceed this distinction, however, because the Court’s concern for the defendant’s increased liability in Concepcion is simply absent from Shady Grove.
In his attempt to resolve the cases’ apparent discrepancies, Professor Nagareda argues that the FAA’s international dimension should
be viewed as the distinguishing factor. He contends that class actions
are a standard method of adjudicating domestic business disputes, and
that for the Hanna analysis in Shady Grove, the effect of class actions
213
can be treated as truly “incidental.” But in cases such as Stolt-Nielsen
and others implicating the FAA, the international dimension of the
214
FAA is overlooked. Because class actions are not nearly as common
in the transnational setting as they are in the domestic setting, Professor Nagareda argues that imposing class arbitration would, in fact, be
215
And, witha “fundamental change” for many international parties.
212

Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1090; see also id. at 1074 (“Across the two cases, the
Court maintains an almost studied avoidance of any explanation for the difference of
view as to class treatment.”). During the 2010 Term, Justice Scalia continued to subscribe to his Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen views. Compare Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910,
1952 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating his stance in Shady Grove that “the sole
purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims that are individually viable”
and that, as such, class actions do not alter the substantive rights of parties), with AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (invoking his reasoning in
Stolt-Nielsen that “the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” leads to
“changes” that are “fundamental,” and exploring these changes in greater depth
(quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
213
Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1101-02.
214
See id. at 1090-99 (arguing that international commerce disputes have informed
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence).
215
Id. at 1101-03.
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out a relative degree of certainty in arbitration, international business
216
could return to being a “legal no-man’s-land.” Finally, tying together this explanation of the Concepcion dispute, he argues that because
Shady Grove was correct vis-à-vis class action litigation, the lower courts
in Concepcion were wrong in holding that the class action waiver in
217
In his view, this is especially
AT&T’s contract was unconscionable.
218
true because AT&T’s waiver is not exculpatory.
While insightful, Professor Nagareda’s analysis misses the mark in
a few key ways. First, although his argument may shed some light on
the differences between Shady Grove and the FAA cases, it deviates substantially from the actual language in Stolt-Nielsen to come up with a
distinguishing factor. Concerns for international relations, no doubt,
play a role in some FAA cases. With this in mind, the Court is argu219
ably fashioning federal common law in an appropriate manner. But
this point should not fundamentally alter the aggregation analysis as
220
Professor Nagareda argues it does.
Second, the plurality’s reasoning in Shady Grove, with which Nagareda agrees, is questionable to say the least. As Professors Stephen
Burbank and Tobias Wolff contend, the Court’s categorization of an
aggregation mechanism’s “expansion of liability exposure [as] merely
an ‘incidental effect’ does not describe reality, and we should not pre221
tend otherwise.” Such a categorization ignores the practical realities
of Rule 23 and its monumental “impact on the regulation of econom222
This categorization, of course, fails to acic and social activity.”
knowledge that under the modern formulation of the rule, negativevalue claims can be converted into headline-grabbing, bet-the223
company cases.

216

Id. at 1097-98.
Id. at 1119-20.
218
Id. at 1126.
219
See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 358 (noting that some federal
courts have properly treated prior FAA cases as subject to federal common law). I say
“arguably” because, as Carrington and Haagen point out, the federal common law of
international relations generally does not involve matters of “slight political consequence,” id., such as Stolt-Nielsen’s rule that class arbitration is a matter of consent.
220
For a similar critique of Professor Nagareda’s inconsistent approach toward
class proceedings in arbitration and in the courts, see Burbank, supra note 208, at
1935-37.
221
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 65.
222
Id. at 25.
223
See id. at 19 (“Certification can transform unenforceable negative-value claims
into an industry-changing event . . . .”).
217
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So if Shady Grove is wrong, does that mean that Concepcion was correct when it highlighted the increased risks to defendants in class arbitration? To a large extent, yes. Surely those risks are real. But what
Concepcion failed to do was consider the flip-side of the equation—the
risk of creating a claim-disabling effect through the removal of class
proceedings. Rather, with respect to the plaintiffs, the Court seemed to
224
follow Shady Grove’s erroneous reasoning. In the same vein, by ignoring the risk to plaintiffs, the Court failed to realize that states should be
able to weigh the risks posed to both plaintiffs and defendants.
An extrapolation of the arguments in Professors Burbank and
Wolff’s critique of the Shady Grove decision helps synthesize these arguments. Both section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules in Shady Grove and the California statute that enabled the unconscionability rule in Discover Bank attempted to set liability policy.
In both cases, the availability or nonavailability of the class action device was the determining factor in the regulatory decision. Therefore,
the class action is not simply a procedural mechanism with an “incidental effect” but rather a deeply rooted means for advancing regulatory choices. States certainly may come to different conclusions on a
waiver’s unconscionability depending on the individual’s incentives to
225
file suit, as is evidenced by New Jersey’s unconscionability analyses.
Congress could also enact its own liability policies that would trump
the state’s regulatory decisions. But viewed in isolation, the state’s decision should not be preempted by a federal statute, like the FAA, that
226
does not endeavor to affect liability policies.
Several lower courts have adopted this line of reasoning. As noted
earlier, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank proclaimed that
“class actions . . . are . . . inextricably linked to the vindication of sub227
stantive rights.” The Maryland Court of Appeals has similarly noted
224

In its brief, AT&T claimed that if the availability of a class action under Rule 23
did not alter the defendant’s aggregate liability in Shady Grove, then the Court could
not deem the class action waiver “exculpatory” because the withholding of class proceedings would not change a defendant’s liability. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11,
at 44-45. Although the Court in Concepcion never actually cited Shady Grove, it effectively came to the same conclusion when it ignored the ruling’s effect on future plaintiffs.
225
See supra text accompanying note 111.
226
Concededly, the Southland decision did interpret the FAA as “creat[ing] a body
of federal substantive law” for issues of arbitrability. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this does not equate
to a congressional intent to affect the liability of wireless phone companies.
227
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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that rather than being a mere matter of procedure, the class action
has a “penumbral remedial aspect” because of its claim-enabling ef228
fect. While Justice Breyer’s recognition of the state’s role in weighing the pros and cons of class proceedings is a good first step, the
Court should come to appreciate this “penumbral remedial aspect” in
future class action cases rather than rely on the sort of flawed reasoning found in Shady Grove. Otherwise, the Court will fail to acknowledge the practical realities of class action waivers. Without class actions, the concern is not simply that plaintiffs will be alone in
arbitration (the title of this Comment is, indeed, somewhat of a misnomer). Instead, the likely consequence of removing class proceedings is that plaintiffs will either have no incentive to go to arbitration,
or they may not even know that their rights have been infringed at all.
V. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PATH TO REFORM
With Concepcion now in the rearview mirror, commentators have
speculated as to whether the entire class action system as we know it
229
will soon be behind us as well. To some extent, this is true; the frequency of class arbitrations will almost assuredly decrease. Fortunately, though, post-Concepcion developments suggest that class action litigation will not be flatlining anytime soon. In the months following
the release of the Concepcion opinion, lower courts have found various
ways to distinguish the case, based both on the unique facts of AT&T’s
class action waiver and the unresolved questions stemming from the
230
opinion. Moreover, reform efforts have commenced, with Congress
already considering a bill that would amend the FAA and with admin228

Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464 (Md. 1997). The court explained that this “penumbral remedial aspect” of class actions helps overcome “procedural or economic impediments that might hinder a normal action [and] make relief
that otherwise might be only potentially available to a plaintiff actually available.” Id.
229
See, e.g., Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class
Actions?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/
04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions (noting Professor
Brian Fitzpatrick’s prediction that a victory for AT&T could lead to “the end of class action litigation”).
230
Although this section focuses on how courts have distinguished Concepcion,
some courts have faithfully followed the opinion. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless,
LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the FAA preempts a Florida
law requiring class-wide proceedings in arbitration); see also Arellano v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., No. 10-5663, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (following Concepcion but noting that the Concepcion opinion had “regrettably” rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that individual arbitration made it cost prohibitive for a single plaintiff to
bring suit).
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istrative agencies considering additional remedies. This Part will begin by briefly analyzing the post-Concepcion landscape. It will then explain that, though efforts to change Concepcion’s effect at the legislative and administrative level are a step in the right direction, tweaks in
the judicial treatment of the class action device could provide immediate protection both for consumers and for states that want to factor
aggregation policies into their regulatory regimes.
A. The Evolving Scope of the Concepcion Opinion
The first noteworthy development regarding Concepcion’s scope
concerns its interaction with the “statutory rights analysis” used by
some lower courts. As Part II mentioned, some courts that invalidated
class action waivers over the past decade used a “statutory rights analy231
sis” rather than the doctrine of unconscionability. Using this analysis, courts have invalidated class action waivers where the foreseeable
result is that plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights
in arbitration.
The analysis seems particularly applicable in situations where
Congress has embedded procedural devices, such as the class action,
232
into a statute to further public policy goals.
For example, when
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991, it expanded the statute’s damages provisions, and in doing so, provided plaintiffs with an
233
Furthermore, statistics since 1991
incentive to bring class claims.
show that the number of employment discrimination class actions
have increased as a result of the amendments, thus improving private
234
enforcement of the federal statute. Therefore, a waiver of class proceedings for a civil rights claim, for instance, would seem to be at odds
with the statutory structure.
To date, the statutory rights analysis has been used to circumvent
both Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion. Prior to Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit invalidated a class action waiver in an antitrust case against American Express because the retention of multiple expert witnesses—which
is par for the course in antitrust cases—was prohibitively expensive for
231

See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
See Marcus, supra note 173, at 162 (“Governments regularly use procedural devices to fine-tune the regulatory force of the substantive law.”).
233
Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 102, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1981a (2006)); see also Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of
Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 367 (2008) (explaining that the Act expanded
compensatory and punitive damage relief).
234
Id. at 367, 374-75.
232
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individual plaintiffs and would have effectively stripped the plaintiffs of
235
their statutory rights. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and
236
On reconsideration,
remanded this decision in light of Stolt-Nielsen.
however, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its previous ruling, concluding
that the Court’s contract approach in Stolt-Nielsen did not control its
237
fact-specific approach centered on the plaintiffs’ statutory rights.
The Second Circuit also found support in earlier FAA cases for its conclusion that a statutory rights analysis can be invoked, notwithstanding
238
the Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration. Although the Second
Circuit conceded that Stolt-Nielsen prevented it from ordering class arbitration, it ruled that Stolt-Nielsen did not prevent class action litigation
239
from moving forward. Notably, the Southern District of New York, in
accordance with this opinion—and apparently sticking its tongue out
toward Washington, D.C.—invalidated a class action waiver the day after
240
the Supreme Court released Concepcion.
If circuit courts continue to follow a statutory rights analysis, then
the Supreme Court will likely grant certiorari at some point to clarify
whether this line of reasoning can act as an exception to the standard
FAA rule favoring arbitration. As an initial matter, the extent to which
these cases can circumvent Concepcion is not entirely clear. Given that
a lawsuit must involve a right protected by federal statute, the statutory
rights analysis is narrower than unconscionability rules like Discover
Bank’s. But what is clear is that the statutory rights analysis provides
an example of how the Court could consider the class action’s role
within substantive law. To her credit, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent
in Stolt-Nielsen, intimates that she would take this approach. She notes
that “class proceedings may be ‘the thing’” in the small claims context
because “without them, potential claimants will have little, if any, in241
But whether she can
centive to seek vindication of their rights.”
235

In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315-20 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated
sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
236
Am. Express Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2401.
237
See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 193-94, 199 (2d Cir. 2011)
(highlighting the narrow reach of Stolt-Nielsen and stressing that “each case which
presents a question of the enforceability of a class action waiver . . . must be considered
on its own merits”).
238
Id. at 197 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
239
Id. at 200.
240
See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (invalidating a class action waiver without a single reference to Concepcion).
241
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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persuade four Justices to join her will certainly be difficult considering
the Court’s recent track record in FAA cases.
A second development regarding Concepcion’s scope—one that is
much narrower than the first but similar in that it involves a federal statute that may conflict with the Court’s interpretation of the FAA—
concerns whether the decision conflicts with certain contracts governed
242
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Just a few months before Concepcion was released, an administrative law judge for the National Labor Relations Board concluded that a class action waiver in an
employer’s arbitration agreement violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4)
of the NLRA because employees could have reasonably believed that
243
Following
they were precluded from filing charges with the Board.
Concepcion, the full Board invited interested parties to submit amicus
244
Adbriefs explaining whether the Board should enforce the waiver.
mittedly, the Board’s decision will be limited to employment contracts
under the NLRA, and employers could presumably cure this problem
simply by being more explicit about their workers’ rights in future contracts. Nevertheless, this case may prove significant, as the Board might
temporarily be able to sidestep Concepcion in the NLRA context.
A third development regarding Concepcion concerns whether lower
courts might take the old-fashioned route and distinguish Concepcion
on its facts. One interpretation of the case is that it only singles out
245
state rules that make class action waivers “per se unenforceable.”
Such a reading does not mean that all class action waivers are “per se
246
Within this gap, unconscionability challenges could
enforceable.”
247
presumably continue.
Indeed, despite Concepcion, one Northern
District of California judge has taken this approach, ruling that California unconscionability law can still be used to invalidate an employ-

242

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 12-CA-25764, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 1, at *11-14 ( Jan. 3,
2011). Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA make it an unfair labor practice to
interfere with employees’ statutory rights under section 7 or to discriminate against
those who file charges with the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(4) (2006).
244
Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 12-CA-25764, 2011
NLRB LEXIS 307, at *1 ( June 16, 2011).
245
John Murray, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Decision on Unconscionability, the Purpose of
the Federal Arbitration Act, and Banning Class Arbitration: Dr. John E. Murray, Jr. on AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, May 18, 2011,
available at LEXIS, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5659 (italics omitted).
246
Id. (italics omitted).
247
See id. (noting that the AT&T contract has “created a new model draft of arbitration clauses in such consumer contracts”).
243
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248

er’s class action waiver. In addition, a New Jersey appellate court recently invalidated a class action waiver that it found to be “too confusing, too vague, and too inconsistent to be enforced,” despite its con249
clusion that Concepcion controlled.
In the same vein, while AT&T’s “consumer-friendly” provisions
perhaps provided an ideal vehicle through which the Court could fur250
ther its FAA policies, their uniqueness also makes the case easily distinguishable. For instance, if the agreement is merely a secondgeneration clause that lacks additional provisions, then a court could
perhaps distinguish Concepcion on its unique facts. Albeit a welcome
development for consumers, this approach would unfortunately do
little to clarify current problems with class action policy.
Finally, a fourth development regarding Concepcion’s scope involves its effect, or lack thereof, on suits brought under state private
attorney general statutes. In the months after Concepcion, a California
appellate court considered whether to enforce a waiver in an employer’s arbitration agreement that prohibited suits by employees under
251
Spethe California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).
cifically, the PAGA allows employees to bring representative actions
252
against their employers for violations of the state’s Labor Code.
These actions are not class actions and are thus not subject to the
253
same requirements, such as certification or notice requirements.
These suits, however, can have some of the same deterrence effects of
254
Ultimately, the court held that the waiver of PAGA
class actions.
suits was unenforceable and that FAA preemption would effectively
255
nullify the benefits of these actions to the public. The court also distinguished Concepcion quite gracefully by noting that a representative

248

See Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, No. 11-0892, 2011 WL 2940690, at *6-7, *1213 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (concluding that the waiver was unconscionable but granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration because the plaintiff had waived this
argument).
249
NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 2011 WL 3273896, at *1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 2011).
250
See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
251
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2011); see also Brown v. Ralphs Grocery
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011).
252
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a).
253
Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-63.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 863-65.
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action in arbitration would not have the same attributes as class arbi256
tration, which so concerned the majority in Concepcion.
While a discussion of the pros and cons of these private attorney
general statutes, such as “day in court” considerations, is beyond the
scope of this Comment, this fourth development underscores that
Concepcion has not completely eliminated the deterrence effect of
court proceedings. Some wrongdoing will still be held in check, even
without the class action. Nevertheless, barring a significant upswing in
the enactment and usage of these types of statutes, other reform efforts are needed to cure the problems resulting from Concepcion.
B. Reform Efforts
Thus far, this Comment has advocated reform efforts solely at the
judicial level, and in particular, for a change in the way the Court views
the class action mechanism in FAA cases. A more flexible approach to
the FAA, rather than the Court’s current rigid approach, would enable
the Court to appreciate the role that class actions play in substantive
257
law. Such a reform does have its disadvantages, however. For example, a case-by-case approach that analyzes how the class action device
either fits into a state’s unconscionability paradigm or into a federal
statutory scheme does require a greater share of courts’ time and resources. Furthermore, there is not always a clear line distinguishing
claims that are prohibitively expensive from those that are economically viable. Even so, a more flexible approach to the FAA would certainly
yield better outcomes than the Court’s current approach, which effectively prohibits plaintiffs from vindicating substantive rights.
There are, however, steps at both the legislative and administrative
levels that could be taken to facilitate a new approach at the judicial
level. Most prominently, after Concepcion was handed down, a group
of lawmakers reintroduced a bill in Congress that would amend the
FAA. The bill, the Arbitration Fairness Act, was originally proposed in

256

Id. at 863.
Other scholars have also advocated a more flexible approach to the FAA, although one that does not necessarily account for the current problems regarding class
action policy. See Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1283 (proposing a functional test for determining when state law singles out arbitration); Diana M. Link & Richard A. Bales,
Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275, 276 (2011) (advocating a
“totality of the circumstances” approach); Wilson, supra note 48, at 792 (concluding
that states should be permitted to invalidate waivers based on unconscionability principles as long as those principles are “applied in an objectively reasonable manner”).
257
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258

2009 and excludes employment contracts and consumer agreements
259
from the FAA’s scope.
As I noted earlier, commentators have labeled it as an attempt to restore Congress’s original intent of only ap260
plying the FAA to parties with relatively equal bargaining power.
The bill, however, will undoubtedly face intense lobbying attacks, and
it has been criticized as taking a “meat cleaver . . . to an issue that requires a scalpel” because not all employees, consumers, and franchi261
sees are unsophisticated bargainers. Nevertheless, the introduction
of the bill is a welcome development to those who are dismayed by the
Court’s current FAA jurisprudence.
Also at the legislative level, it will be interesting to see whether states
begin enacting more private attorney general statutes like California’s
PAGA statute. State lawmakers who want to increase deterrence efforts
aimed at harmful business practices should consider enacting these statutes because presumably they would have a greater chance of with262
Additionally, even supporstanding an FAA preemption challenge.
ters of limited government intervention may react favorably to this
method of reform because it would leave the enforcement of substan263
tive law up to the courts, rather than politicized public agencies.
Finally, at the administrative level, the recently established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is in a position to help
guarantee the availability of class remedies through future regulations.
However, the CFPB, which emerged as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
264
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, is only beginning to
take shape, and Republican lawmakers have adamantly opposed the
265
Bureau’s organizational plans. Thus, a considerable amount of time
258

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
260
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
261
See Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1273 (quoting Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against
the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4, 7) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
262
See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
263
Cf. Burbank, supra note 208, at 1931 (noting that private enforcement actions,
such as class actions, can be “critically important to the vindication of substantive law
norms in a society that distrusts, and is therefore unwilling to commit adequate resources to, centralized government enforcement”).
264
§ 1011(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 5491(a) (West Supp. 2011).
265
Republicans have opposed plans proposed by the CFPB chief architect, Elizabeth
Warren, and are expected to block President Obama’s appointee for the CFPB director
position, Richard Cordray. Tamara Keith, New Consumer Protection Agency Faces Opposition,
NPR ( July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138550502/new-consumerprotection-agency-faces-opposition. At the time of writing, Cordray had been approved
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may pass before the agency implements any reform efforts.
But
aside from these obstacles, once the CPFB is up and running, it
should immediately consider reforming the use of class action waivers
to help cure the injustices the Concepcion opinion created.
CONCLUSION
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion was a crossroads for the future of
class action policy, the protection of consumer rights, and the use of
class arbitration as a technique for dispute resolution. This Comment
has demonstrated why an appreciation for the “penumbral remedial
267
aspect” of the class action and for states’ roles in formulating aggregation policy should have been factored into the Court’s analysis.
While subsequent developments may limit or reform Concepcion’s
scope, the Court should nevertheless reconsider its views on class action policy in future cases.
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